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Abstract—Heterogeneous wireless networks is a term refer-
ring to networks combining different radio access technolo-
gies with the aim of establishing the best connection possible.
In this case, users with multi-mode terminals can connect via
different wireless technologies, such as 802.16, 802.11, UMTS,
HSPA and LTE, all at the same time. The problem consists in
the selection of the most suitable from all radio access tech-
nologies available. The decision process is called network se-
lection, and depends on several parameters, such as quality of
service, mobility, cost, energy, battery life, etc. Several meth-
ods and approaches have been proposed in this context, with
their objective being to offer the best QoS to the users, and/or
to maximize re-usability of the networks. This paper repre-
sents a survey of the network selection methods used. Multiple
attribute-dependent decision-making methods are presented.
Furthermore, the game theory concept is illustrated, the use of
the fuzzy logic is presented, and the utility functions defining
the network selection process are discussed.
Keywords—always best connected, fuzzy logic, game theory,
multiple attribute decision making, quality of service, radio ac-
cess technologies.
1. Introduction
Two decades ago, the IEEE dominated the Internet mar-
ket with the IEEE 802.11 standard. It was a big innova-
tion in terms of cost and high data throughputs. At that
time, 3GPP’s cellular technology was the Global System
of Mobile Telecommunication (GSM). It is considered to
be an excellent technology for calling and sending text mes-
sages, but it can’t provide Internet access. This has pushed
3GPP developers to introduce the Global Packet Radio Ser-
vice (GPRS). Unfortunately, Internet access with a higher
data throughput was not possible either. In the next up-
date, 3GPP changed the circuit-switched functionality to
the packet-switched variety, and they called this release the
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) or
the third generation network (3G).
Before 3G networks arrived, radio access networks were
mainly homogeneous. Later, development of network tech-
nologies has led to an impressive growth of Internet ap-
plications and services, as well as to the development of
the mobile user industry. Presently, people are equipped
with smartphones and seek “always the best connectivity”
(ABC). It is obvious that no single Radio Access Technol-
ogy (RAT) can offer the ABC. Therefore, it was necessary
to move from homogeneous systems to their heterogeneous
counterparts. The aim of the fourth generation (4G) net-
works is to satisfy the ABC concept by offering mobile
users the ability to take advantage of those networks which
offer different architectures and performance levels. Nowa-
days, we have a variety of RATs: WLAN, IEEE 802.11,
UMTS, HSPA and LTE. All of them make up a heteroge-
neous environment (Fig. 1). A heterogeneous system allows
mobile users to choose multiple RATs based on several cri-
teria. This choice is known as network selection (NS) and
is the very area this paper is concerned with.
Fig. 1. Heterogeneous wireless environment.
The network selection procedure consists of selecting the
best network from all those that are available. However, due
to many parameters, such as cost, QoS and the amount of
energy consumed, the decision is complex. This allows us
to say that the NS problem may be defined, in basic terms,
as a dynamic and automatic choice of the best wireless ac-
cess network, taking into account a number of parameters.
In the case of older cellular technologies, NS was based
on physical layer parameters, and the mobile terminal was
often assigned to the best received base station. Such a se-
lection policy is obviously not suitable for heterogeneous
wireless access technologies, because the user may favor to
connect to a RAT with a lower load, located at a greater
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distance and offering a lower level of the received signal
strength (RSS), rather than to a more loaded cell with high
RSS.
NS in a heterogeneous environment can be described as
a multiple attribute decision making (MADM) problem,
because of the number of parameters and criteria in-
volved [1]–[4]. Other methods, such as fuzzy logic, game
theory and utility functions have been proposed to solve
the NS problem in [5], [6] and will be surveyed in this pa-
per. Other methods pertaining to multi-criteria optimization
have been used to deal with the NS problem as well. These
include artificial intelligence, neural networks and genetic
algorithms, and will not be in this paper because of their
limited popularity.
This paper is organized as follows. After introduction, Sec-
tion 2 is devoted to the NS procedure, while in Section 3
we focus on the approaches and methods used to solve the
NS problem, as presented in literature. In Section 4, a sum-
mary of the discussed methods and approaches is presented,
along with a recap table.
2. Network Selection Process
The NS process consists of switching between different
RATs, to be always best served. So, when a multi-mode
user discovers the existence of various RATs within its area,
it should be able to select the best network in terms of de-
lay, jitter, throughput and packet loss rate (Fig. 2). The
NS procedure is the general case of the handover process
(HO), which can be either centralized (network-centric) or
decentralized (user-centric).
For the network-centric approach, the operator controls the
whole process and makes decisions. It is a good strategy
to avoid problems, such as selfish behavior of users who
try to get the best RAT at the same time, which results
in congestion. On the other hand, this strategy cannot be
used in the case of multiple operators. For the user-centric
approach, users make decisions by themselves. This ap-
proach is known as decentralized and can easily generate
congestion because of the selfish nature of users. Nowa-
days, almost all operators offer 3G and 4G radio access
and also Wi-Fi connections, so the first approach is more
suitable for regular use.
Many parameters influence the process of selecting the best
RAT: battery level, energy required to get the services re-
quested, RSS received, cost, bandwidth acquired, user pref-
erences, QoS required, etc. These parameters can be cate-
gorized into four groups:
• network conditions parameters – information about
network conditions, such as network load, coverage
area, network connection time, available bandwidth,
• application requirements parameters – information
about the threshold needed by the service applica-
tion to be in the normal state, as well as required
throughput, delay, jitter, packet loss rate, and energy
needed for the application,
• user preference parameters – information relative to
end users, i.e. user acceptable cost, preference be-
tween cost and service quality,
• mobile equipment parameters – information about the
user’s device, i.e. battery level status and mobility.
The parameters may also be dynamic or static, and may
require to be maximized or minimized. For example, the
Fig. 2. Network selection process.
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Table 1
Network selection inputs and classification of parameters
Parameters group Parameters Type Expected as
Network conditions
• network load Dynamic Minimized
• network coverage Static Fixed
• network connection time
Dynamic
Minimized
• available bandwidth Maximized
Application requirements
• throughput
Dynamic Maximized
• delay
• jitter
• PLR
• energy consumption
User preferences
• budget
Static Fixed
• cost
Mobile equipment
• battery level
Dynamic Fixed
• mobility
delay parameter is related to network conditions, network
load and user’s RSS – it is a dynamic parameter that must
be minimized (Table 1).
The network selection process consists mainly of the fol-
lowing actions:
• Monitoring step. It consists in identifying the avail-
able RAT, collecting the network’s radio parameters
and other RAT characteristics. In this stage, some
of the parameters are estimated and others are calcu-
lated.
• Decision step. It initiates the NS decision. The choice
of the best network is based on the monitoring pro-
cess and on other parameters provided by the mobile
device, such as user’s preferences. In this stage, the
decision process is applied to rank the RATs.
• Execution step. It consists in connecting to the target
RAT.
The NS procedure is started when a new service is re-
quested, such as a video/VoIP call or a data transfer ser-
vice, also when the received RSS drops below the threshold
value and after the user’s radio connection worsens, for in-
stance when the user is mobile. As far as the application
requirements are concerned, NS depends on the type of
service desired. For VoIP, delay and packet loss rate are
important parameters. For a video service – bandwidth
and delay, while for a best effort service – the bandwidth
acquired.
3. Network Selection Solutions
Many authors have modeled the solution of the NS problem,
presenting different propositions in order to find the most
appropriate one. In this section, we present a survey of the
methods used to solve the NS problem.
3.1. MADM Methods
MADM is an analytical approach focusing on preferen-
tial decisions. It treats problems with numerous decision-
related criteria, and is widely used in various areas of exper-
tise, such as economy [7]–[9]. The basics of this approach
are divided into three groups:
• Alternatives – a set of the actors who will be ranked.
In the NS scenario, the alternatives have the form of
RAT lists.
• Set of attributes – it represents the parameters or the
criteria used in the decision-making process. For
the NS scenario, the parameters are the throughput
achieved, jitter, packet loss and delay.
• Weights – the importance of a given parameter or the
criteria relied upon in the decision process.
By using such a taxonomy, we get a decision matrix repre-
senting the system, where the columns are the criteria and
the lines are the alternatives.
Several decision-making methods have been proposed in
MADM context, such as: simple additive weight (SAW),
technique to order preference by similarity to ideal solution
(TOPSIS), weighted product model (WPM) and analytical
hierarchy process (AHP) [8].
SAW, TOPSIS and WPM are also qualified as ranking
methods that need other methods to weigh the criteria,
while AHP relies on a process that generates the weights
for the criteria.
It is important to note that these methods are applicable
only when all data of the input matrix are expressed with
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the use of the same unit. Therefore, data must be normal-
ized, which is an important step in the network selection
procedure. Table 2 represents a non-exhaustive list of com-
mon normalization methods.
Table 2
Normalization methods
Method Value
Max-min ei j =
xi j −min(xi j)
max(xi j)−min(xi j)
Sum ei j =
xi j
n
∑
i=1
xi j
Square root ei j =
xi j√
n
∑
i=1
xi j
The weight that a given parameter has for the use is another
important point, e.g. QoS-based, cost-based and/or energy-
based. Weights are related to the user profile and can be
subjective or objective. Subjective weights are empirical
values based on experience. For example, in the case of
QoS-based users, while initiating a VoIP session, such pa-
rameters as delay and packet loss ratio have 60 to 70%
of importance and bandwidth is not as important. In the
case of a video session, bandwidth is more important than
other parameters (50% of importance). Objective weights
are given by the formulas shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Weighting methods
Method Value
Entropy w j = 1−
1
N
n
∑
i=1
[
xi j ln(xi j)
]
Variance w j =
1
N
n
∑
i=1
xi j
Eigenvector w(B−λ I) = 0
The AHP method contains an auto-creative system to gener-
ate the weight vector using the eigenvectors and eigenvalues
of the input matrix.
3.1.1. Simple Additive Weight (SAW)
SAW is a method for the case of multiple-criteria systems
[8], [10], [11]. In SAW, the first data is normalized, then
the candidate having the highest/lowest value is selected:
RSAW =
n
∑
i=1
(
w j × rij
)
, (1)
where RSAW is the value of each candidate, w j is the weight
value of the parameter j and ri j is the normalized value of
parameter j and network i.
The SAW method has been widely used in the context
of network selection. In [11] and [12], authors have used
the SAW method to get a ranked list of networks, while
in [8], authors made a mix between the game theory and
the SAW method. When the NS problem is approached by
using the SAW method and other variants, the main benefit
of the SAW method resides in its simplicity and low com-
plexity. However, its drawback is that one parameter can
be outweighed by another one.
3.1.2. Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)
TOPSIS is an aggregating compensatory method based on
the concept that the chosen solution should have the shortest
geometric distance from the positive ideal solution [13] and
the longest geometric distance from the negative ideal solu-
tion. The normalized data for each parameter are weighted
and therefore the geometric distance between each alterna-
tive and the ideal alternative is computed. The TOPSIS
process is carried out as follows.
• First, an evaluation matrix consisting of m alterna-
tives and n criteria is created, with the intersection of
each alternative and criterion given as xi j. It results
in a matrix (xi j)m×n.
• The matrix (xi j)m×n is then normalized to get
(ri j)m×n using one of the methods from Table 2.
• Calculate the weighted normalized decision matrix
where ti j =w j×(ri j)m×n, w j =
Wj
∑ni=1(Wj)
, ∑ni=1(Wj)=1
and j = 1, . . . , m, i = 1, . . . , n.
• Determine the best and worst alternative Ab and Aw,
respectively.
Ab = bPj = max(ti j) , j ∈ J+ ,
Aw = wPj = min(ti j) , j ∈ J− ,
where J+ and J− contain the criteria with positive
and negative impact respectively.
• Calculate the separation measure for each alternative:
DP =
√
n
∑
i=1
(
w2j × (ri j−bPj )2
)
,
DN =
√
n
∑
i=1
(
w2j × (ri j−a
N
j )
2
)
.
• Calculate the relative closeness to the ideal solution
RTOPSIS =
DP
DP +DN
. (2)
TOPSIS has been applied to the network selection prob-
lem in several works, e.g. [9], [11], [14]. In [11], authors
compare the performance of vertical handover using SAW
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and TOPSIS. They concluded that TOPSIS outperforms the
SAW method. In general, TOPSIS and other compensatory
methods managed to avoid the problem that a parameter can
be outperformed by another one by allowing a trade-off be-
tween criteria. This means that a poor value of one criterion
can be neglected by a good value in another. This offers
a huge benefit and is more sensible than non-compensatory
methods, which use a threshold system.
3.1.3. Weighted Product Model (WPM)
WPM, also known as multiplicative exponential weighting
(MEW), is a method similar to SAW [15]. The difference
consists in the replacement of the addition operation used
in the SAW method, with multiplication. Each alternative
decision is compared with the remaining ones by multi-
plying a number of ratios, one for each decision criterion.
Each ratio is raised to the power equivalent to the relative
weight of the corresponding criterion:
RW PM =
n
∏
i=1
(ri j)
w
j . (3)
Authors in [16] made a comparison between SAW and
WPM methods in the context of vertical handover. They
used the relative standard deviation as a metric of compar-
ison and they arrived at a conclusion that WPM is better
than SAW. In [17], the WPM method was used in the con-
text of heterogeneous systems. Their conclusion is that
the WPM method is a more robust approach for dynamic
decision making and it penalizes the attributes with poor
quality.
3.1.4. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Grey Re-
lational Analysis (GRA)
AHP assumes that one complicated problem is decomposed
into a multiple-hierarchy simple sub-problems. AHP steps
are:
• decomposing the problem into a hierarchy of sub-
problems, where the top node is the final goal and
where alternatives are listed for each criterion,
• pair-wise comparison of attributes and translating
them into numerical values from 1 to 9,
• calculating the weights of each level of the hierarchy,
• synthesizing weights and getting overall weights.
As far as the GRA method is concerned, it is used to rank
the candidate networks and it involves the following steps:
• normalization of data is performed considering three
situations: higher is better through lower is better,
and nominal is the desired,
• definition of the ideal sequence in the three situations
considered is set: the ideal sequence contains the
higher bound, lower bound and moderate bound,
• computing the grey relational coefficient (GRC): the
sequence in which GRC is larger is more favorable.
The AHP is usually coupled with the GRA method: AHP
for weighting, and GRA for ranking alternatives. Authors
in [18] used a modified version of AHP and compared it
with normal AHP using the QoE criterion. Their numeri-
cal results show that the proposed scheme outperforms the
conventional AHP scheme, resulting in a good load bal-
ance. In [19], authors relied on AHP to rank various criteria
used to compare the desirability of different Internet adver-
tising networks. The proposed model provides an objective
and effective decision model to be used by advertisers in
selecting an Internet advertising network.
To recapitulate: MADM methods are widely used to solve
the network selection problem, this is due to the fact that
network selection involves the same problems as are solved
by MADM. Moreover, these methods are known for their
ease of use, clarity and low complexity of computation.
The disadvantages of these methods are listed below.
Firstly, these methods do not offer the same level of perfor-
mance with respect to different services (VoIP, video calls
and web browsing) (Table 4). Secondly, they suffer from
the problem of ranking abnormality, i.e. the phenomenon
occurs in the MADM methods when an exact replica or
a copy of an alternative is introduced or eliminated.
Authors in [20] have shown that the rank reversal prob-
lem occurs in the majority of well-known MADM methods.
This problem has been addressed in other works [21], [22],
by introducing specific modifications, but the original ver-
sions of MADM methods suffer from the rank reversal
problem. Additionally, the AHP method is very compli-
cated and requires complex computations when calculating
the vector of weights. Due to all these reasons, we can say
that MADM are a good solution, but the lack of a general
method that would be suitable for all kinds of services is
a problem.
Table 4
MADM method pros and cons
Advantages Disadvantages
Easy to understand Rank reversal phenomena
Easy to implement High complexity such
as AHP
Good results in some cases Good performance with
some services and bad
results for others
3.2. Game Theory
Game theory allows to model competitive situations, which
implies an interaction between rational decision makers and
mutual, and possibly conflicting interests [9], [11], [12]. It
provides an analytical tool to predict the outcome of com-
plicated interactions between rational conflicting entities.
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In this paper, we focus on the use of game theory for mod-
eling the network selection problem [23].
An example of a conflicting scenario in which a game the-
ory solves the problem is described below. As a rule, the
fundamental characteristic of a game is that the gain of
a player depends on his choices and also on the choices
made by the other players. Games of this type are known
as strategic games.
A game is represented mainly by three sets: a set of players
that contains the rational actor competing to get a bigger
pay-off. A set of actions or strategies which depends on the
information available in the system. Obviously, each player
seeks the action which maximizes their revenue. The pay-
off is the objective function representing the player’s rev-
enue when choosing a specific strategy. The pay-off for
each player can be represented as the actual or expected
benefit the player receives by playing the current strategy.
The game is played until the player is capable of obtaining
more gains. When the pay-off cannot be enhanced any fur-
ther with any other strategy combinations, an equilibrium
known as the Nash equilibrium is reached.
The Nash equilibrium occurs basically when no player can
obtain more gain by changing their strategy, with the strate-
gies of the other players remaining unchanged. The Nash
equilibrium is a combination of the best strategies for all
players. A detailed representation of a strategic game is:
• Game = {P, A, G};
• P = {1, n} the set of players;
• A = {a1, an} the set of actions, denoting the set of
strategies available to the player i, 1≤ i≤ n;
• G : {payof f} represents the reward achieved when
choosing a strategy. Here, to simplify things, the
pay-off function is a linear summation of local gains,
with the weights of each parameter applied.
Different types of games are used to model various coop-
erative or competitive situations between rational decision
makers. Some of the most widely used game theory models
are outlined below.
3.2.1. Cooperative and Non-cooperative Games
A cooperative game is a situation in which players claim to
display cooperative behaviors. In this situation, the play-
ers plan, in groups, to choose their actions. In a non-
cooperative game, also known as a competitive game, all
options available to the players are specified, while con-
tracts underlying the coalitions in a cooperative game are
not described. Each player tries to reach his goal without
regarding the other players. Here, the players are called
rational [24]. Generally, non-cooperative games admit a
solution called the Nash equilibrium, while for the cooper-
ative games the solution is a total surplus generated by the
coalition of players.
3.2.2. Games with Complete/Perfect Information
Complete information is a term used in game theory to
describe games in which knowledge about other players is
available to all participants. Every player knows the pay-off
and the strategies available to other players. Games with
complete and perfect information are significantly differ-
ent. In a game with complete information, the structure of
the game and the pay-off functions of the players are com-
monly known, but players may not see all of the moves
made by other players. For the perfect information games,
each player is perfectly informed of all the events that have
previously occurred, but may lack some information about
the pay-off of others players or on the structure of the game.
Inversely, in games with incomplete information, some
players do not know the information of other participants,
like other players’ pay-off. In a game with imperfect infor-
mation, players are simply unaware of the actions chosen by
others. However, they know who the other players are, their
possible strategies and their preferences. Hence, the data
about the other players is imperfect, but complete [23], [24].
3.2.3. Repeated Games
In strategic games, players make their decisions simultane-
ously at the beginning of the game. On the contrary, the
extensive game model defines the possible orders of events.
In this case, players can make decisions during the game
and they can react to others decisions. Extensive games can
be finite or infinite. Repeated games are a variety of exten-
sive games in which a game is played for a number times
and the players can observe the outcome of the previous
game before attending the next iteration [24], [25].
3.2.4. Zero-sum Games
A situation in which one person’s gain is equivalent to
another’s loss, so the net change in wealth or benefit is
zero. A zero-sum game may have two or more players.
They are usually called strictly competitive games in the
game theory discipline, but are less widespread than non-
zero sum games [25].
3.3. Game Theory on Network Selection
In this subsection, we will discuss works that use the game
theory to solve the network selection problem. As we men-
tioned above, a game is defined by three sets: players, ac-
tions and payoff. In the network case, players can be users,
networks or both. A distinction between those categories
will be made below.
3.3.1. Game between Users
In [5], authors modeled a competition between users for
one access point as an evolutionary game. Users represent
players that compete to maximize the transmission rate.
The latter represents the strategy, hence the pay-off is mod-
eled by an objective function. This function takes the delay
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and packet loss rate and determines the mean opinion score
MOS, which is a measure for voice quality. In [5], the no-
tion of free users is used. VoIP is the only service used and
the authors claim that the equilibrium reached is optimal.
In [26], the problem of the least congested access point
selection is emphasized. The set of strategies contains dif-
ferent access points available and the pay-off is a trade-off
between bandwidth gained and the effort generated when
moving to the new access point. The authors demonstrate
that the result of this game is the distribution of users on
the access points.
In [27] authors consider the scenario with a single Wi-
Fi network and multiple access points. In this case study,
users can choose one access point to connect to, the pay-off
function depends on the congestion level of the access point
and cost. The authors affirm that the Nash equilibrium is
reached.
The works mentioned above suggest that a game between
users means that players seek, in general, non-cooperative
behavior and because of the selfish nature of users, these
games lead to the situation of congestion, and also to the
monopolization of resources by certain users.
3.3.2. Game between Networks
When players represent the networks, the latter compete
to get the attention of users and maximize the number of
users connected, to achieve more revenue. In [28], authors
present a non-cooperative game mechanism between net-
works in which the players compete for a service require-
ment and try to gain the maximum of an access point. This
represents user satisfaction. The problem of this scheme
is that the preferences toward players are the same. In
[29] authors have introduced the strategy space and quality
point concepts, the players are the networks and the pay-
off function determines which access network will provide
the service requested by the user, which corresponds to the
distribution of service requests amongst the networks.
In [30] researchers have investigated the admission control
problem by modeling a multi-round game between two Wi-
Fi networks. Here, the players in the game are the two
networks, and the strategy set is the user’s service requests.
The pay-off of the game is the distribution of the service
requests between the competitive networks.
The papers referred to above prove that games between net-
works are characterized by one well-known strategy, i.e. by
seeking the maximum revenue or maximizing the number
of users connected to the network. This approach guides
users to think about their corresponding network selection
schemes under this network in a competitive environment.
3.3.3. Game between Users and Networks
In this case, players act as mobile users and/or networks.
In [31] authors propose a reputation-based network selec-
tion mechanism by modeling the interaction between users
and networks using a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
To reinforce the cooperation between users and networks,
authors combine the reputation-based systems and game
theory. The network reputation factor represents the net-
work’s past behavior in the network selection decision. Re-
searchers show that using reputation is essential in the case
of cooperation and that repeated interaction maintains co-
operation.
In [32] the network selection problem having the form of
a non-cooperative auction game is modeled, in which buy-
ers represent users, sellers/bidders are the available net-
work operators and the auction component is the requested
bandwidth with its associated attributes. The auction that
maximizes the user utility is the winning bid.
In [33] a non-cooperative resource allocation based on the
Cournot game between a provider and his customers is pre-
sented, where users are classified into three classes: pre-
mium, gold and silver. The strategies for the provider and
the customer are as follows. The provider seeks customers
who bring high revenue, while if the customers are not sat-
isfied from the received QoS, they can decide to leave the
network. Users are accepted into the network if the new
benefit computed when a new customer arrives is less than
the provider’s benefit value. Finally, the authors identify
the equilibrium for resource distribution. This game type
can be summarized in the following manner: users compete
against networks, each seeking to maximize their own ben-
efits. On the one hand, users try to maximize their benefits
(cost- and/or QoS-related). On the other hand, the networks
try to maximize the profit for the services provided.
3.4. Fuzzy Logic
In fuzzy logic, there are few degrees of satisfaction of
a condition [34]. Unlike in Boolean algebra, where a pro-
posal is considered to be true or false, fuzzy logic adds
a degree of truth to choose from the 0. . .1 range. It is
a tool of artificial intelligence used in various fields [35].
The concept is based on the theory of fuzzy sets with an
extension of the classical theory. Fuzzy logic brings the
concept of partial truth, where the truth value may vary
from completely true to completely false.
3.4.1. Fuzzy Logic in Network Selection
A few studies have addressed the network selection prob-
lem using fuzzy logic as a core of the ranking scheme.
Basically, authors use fuzzy logic in network selection in
two ways: as a combination of MADM and fuzzy logic, or
they use it as the selection scheme.
In [6] authors propose a general scheme to solve the
multi-criteria network selection problem. In the proposed
scheme, the multi-criteria network selection solution is ob-
tained by considering the users’ requirements and QoS. The
proposed scheme is scalable and is capable of handling any
number of RATs with a large set of criteria. The simula-
tion results show that the proposed solution has a better
and more robust performance over the reference solutions.
In [36] researchers describe two novel, fuzzy logic based
ranking schemes. These schemes enable users to evaluate
the correctness of different combinations of P2P-based grid
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networks. A fixed set of commonly used attributes is used,
such as cost, capacity and reliability. The proposed ranking
algorithm is based on an intuitive rule optimization design
applying Boolean logic to capture input combinations.
In [37] authors propose a fusion method-based fuzzy logic
approach for different network schemes. The main advan-
tage is the consideration of the relative importance of differ-
ent networks. The authors show that the proposed scheme
significantly improves the generalization capability.
Most of the recent works using the fuzzy logic are com-
bined with MADM methods [38], [39]. Generally, in the
field of network selection, the use of fuzzy logic as a core
of the ranking scheme is not widely adopted. Instead, fuzzy
logic has always been combined with MADM.
3.5. Utility Functions
Utility is the “satisfaction” we get from using, owning or
doing something. It is what allows us to choose between
options.
A preference function utility assigns values to the ranking
of a set of choices. This is useful in analyzing consumer
behavior in the maximization problem. Faced with a set of
options and a budget constraint, we will choose what satis-
fies them to the highest degree. Utility functions are often
expressed as U(x1, x2, x3), which means that U (utility) is
a function of the quantities of x1, x2 and so on. In the case
of monotonic functions, if A is a set of goods, and A > B,
then U(A) > U(B). That is, if A is preferred to B.
For making a decision, utility refers to the level of sat-
isfaction that goods or a service provide to the decision
maker [40]. Utility function is an associated term which
relates to the utility derived by a consumer from goods or
a service. Different consumers with various user prefer-
ences will have different utility values for the same prod-
uct. Thus, the individual preferences should be taken into
account in the utility evaluation.
In the paper [41] authors show that many of the commonly
used MADM algorithms, such as SAW, WPM and TOP-
SIS, in their standard form, are not best suited because of
their assumptions concerned with a monotonous increase or
decrease of the attributes’ utilities. They affirm that both
monotonic and non-monotonic utilities can be taken into
consideration, and are therefore better suited for achieving
this type of optimization objectives.
In [42] researchers proposed a user-centric RAN selection
strategy based on maximizing consumer surplus, subject to
meeting user-defined constraints in terms of transfer com-
pletion time. An exploration of a number of possible utility
functions based on different user’s attitudes to risk is pre-
sented. They affirm that simulations produced results that
correspond to the user utility descriptions input. The risk
taker ends up paying more, but enjoying less delay.
In [43] researchers proposed a user-centric RAN selection
strategy based on maximizing consumer surplus subject to
meeting user-defined constraints in terms of transfer com-
pletion time. An exploration of a number of possible utility
functions based on different user’s attitudes to risk is pre-
sented. They affirm that simulations produced results that
correspond to the in-putted user utility descriptions. The
risk taker ends up paying more, but enjoying less delay.
In [44] the researchers have proposed a method called SU-
TIL, which is a mechanism for network selection in the
context of next generation networks. It prioritizes networks
with higher relevance to the application and lower energy
consumption, enabling full and seamless connectivity with
mobile devices and applications. They even propose some
future works, such as conducting an investigation to ad-
dress the interaction between multiple instances of SUTIL
and consideration of the highly dynamic nature intrinsic of
the environments where SUTIL operates.
4. Analysis and Discussion
Figure 3 presents the approaches described in this paper.
At the top of the flow chart is the NS problem, in the sec-
ond row different approaches and their categories, namely
MADM, game theory, fuzzy logic and utility functions
are placed. Each category has its own specific methods
Fig. 3. Summary of NS methods used.
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Table 5
Summary of the discussed methods
Type Advantages Disadvantages
Easy to understand and use Rank reversal phenomenon
Ranking methods Relatively good results Lack of a weighting process
Low complexity Different behavior with various applications
Weighting/rating methods Weighting process
Rank reversal phenomenon
High complexity
Users vs. users
Users vs. networks No rank reversal phenomenon Selfish behavior of users lead to the congestion
Networks vs. networks
As a core method
Overcome the MADM’s drawbacks
Few works in the literature
With another approach Time consuming due to coupling two approaches
Without other methods Solving simple problems
With another approach
Powerful and used in many works Few works in the literature
Overcome the MADM’s drawbacks
(if such exist), which are regrouped in the bottom row and
are summarized in Table 5:
• Ranking methods. TOPSIS, SAW, WPM and others –
methods which require another method to obtain the
weight vector. Such methods suffer from a lot of
problems, such as the rank reversal phenomenon, and
the influence of a bad value of a criterion on the good
value of another criterion.
• Ranking/weighting methods. These methods suffer
from high complexity and rank reversal, which can
occur here as well, because it is a problem affecting
the entire MADM approach.
• Game theory. Game theory is a good tool to model
the network selection problem. The main concern
is the computation time, due to the relatively high
complexity degree. This issue may be avoided in the
case of a game between networks.
• Fuzzy logic. It has been adapted to solve the network
selection problem but, generally, it is not used alone,
it needs to be accompanied by MADM methods or
genetic algorithms.
• Utility functions. The utility function is used with
other methods, such as fuzzy logic or MADM, and
it can also be used in a unilateral way.
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